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The cost behavior is one of the most important aspect of the analysis of businesses 
profitability. The traditional model of study of its behavior requires strict proportion with the 
level of activity, something that is not shared by modern studies. To understand better the 
behavior of asymmetric cost, our work examines the behavior of the Greek retail food, 
beverages and tobacco companies. We studied 438 limited companies for a period of 12 
years, and noticed that a 1% increase in sales, leads to an increase of 1.011% of the cost, 
while the corresponding reduction lowers the cost of sales by 0,905%. The industry 
addressed by our study, has a direct relation to all households. So, it is important the 
industry to be studied further, in order to give more opportunities and benefits for consumers 
and state. Last,, future studies can use our study in an attempt to  understand better the 
behavior of asymmetric costs. 
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1.          Introduction 
 
The traditional model distinguishes the total costs into fixed and variable. It also 
dictates that the total cost varies depending on the fluctuation in production or sales 
(Norren 1991; Garrison & Noreen, 2002). In the early 90s, studies consistently cited 
that costs tend not to change symmetrical or proportionally with the changes of an 
activity. In fact, dictate that changes in costs, are not solely determined by changes 
in production volume or capacity (Banker & Johnston, 1993), stressing that some 
costs do not change, even if the activity is reduced (Malcom, 1991). 
 
Considering then, the traditional model obsolete, Noreen & Soderstrom (1997) and 
Cooper & Kaplan (1998), were among the first to bibliographically begin studying 
the sticky cost. Supporting the above mentioned view, Anderson Banker and 
Janakiraman (2003) had been studying 7629 companies for over 20 years and noted 
that sales, general and administrative costs increased more on average 0.55% per 1% 
increase in sales but decreased only 0.35% per 1% decrease in sales. Essentially, the 
sticky cost is the cost that increases more with increasing sales than decreases when 
sales fell in respectively. 
 
The sticky cost may be increased, but cannot be reduced in a short time (Mak et al., 
1994). Some believe, that is a result of the intervention of managers in production 
and of the engineering operation of cost (ABJ, 2003; Kajiwara et al, 2011: Banker et 
al, 20066 . Instead, Shannon et al. (2007), reject the notion that the sticky cost is due 
to the interference of managers and that there are costs that are arising mechanically. 
While Balakrishnan et al. (2010) believe that some events that arise from the 
mechanical structure of cost are responsible for the asymmetries. In cost elements 
such as the proportion of fixed and variable costs, economies of scale and the 
reduction rate of sales, affect the degree of stickiness. 
 
Balakrishnan et al. (2004) confirmed the existence of sticky cost on physical therapy 
clinics in the United States, and Balakrishnan et al. (2008) observed that the costs 
that have to do with care and treatment of patients, are more inelastic (sticky) than 
the remaining costs. Subramaniam and Weidenmier (2003), while studying the 
behavior of costs in various business sectors, found that sales, general and 
administrative costs and the cost of sales in all business sectors, have asymmetric 
6The Banker, Ciftci & Mashruwala (2006), analyzed how optimism or pessimism of managers affect the allocation 
of resources.]) 
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cost behavior, ie sticky, only when the income changes are higher than 10%. 
Specifically: 
• Manufacturing companies have a high sticky cost. This is due to the high 
level of fixed assets.  
• The traders have lower sticky cost. This is due to the existence of high 
competition, which makes businesses respond promptly to major changes. 
• Finally, financial companies and the service companies observed some level 
of sticky cost which arises from the interest expenses (Financial), and 
workers in the census (for service providers). 
 
Anderson et al, (2007), noted that while revenues are declining, the proportion of 
sales, general and administrative costs increased rather than decreased in proportion 
to sales, this may be due to the sticky cost.  While Weiss (2010) argues that while 
there is the sticky cost there is also the anti-sticky cost, ie the cost that increases less 
when economic activity increases than decrease when economic activity is reduced 
by an equal amount.  
 
In the above graph, the straight line represents the normal cost, the dashed one the 
anti-sticky, while the bold one represents sticky cost. Kama et al. (2010) believe that 
there are two possible sources of sticky cost. First, managers intentionally intervene 
in the production, to achieve personal goals and ambitions. Second, the limitation of 
technology. The study noted that companies with limited technology, exhibit high 
sticky cost. On the contrary, those with developed technology, exhibit sticky cost. It 
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is also noted that adjustments of resources by managers to achieve personal goals, 
actually repel sticky cost and favor the symmetric cost. 
 
Banker et. al. (2010) were based on the work of ABJ (2003) but disagreed with the 
assumption that the sticky cost occurs only when sales decline and concluded that 
the decisions of managers affect the cost, both to increase sales and reduce their 
Calleja et al (2006) studying businesses USA, UK, Germany and France, tried to see 
whether the system of corporate governance of the administrations has any impact 
on cost stickiness. So they noticed, that in the United Kingdom and the United 
States, where the administration to the interests of shareholders, giving fewer 
benefits to employees, revenues are higher and this leads to less sticky cost. On the 
other hand, because of the above benefits offered by administrations of German and 
French firms to workers, their income is lower and firms exhibit high sticky cost. 
 
Banker et al. (2006) studied characteristics such as the bargaining power of unions, 
the level of unemployment benefits, legislation, etc., on a sample of 12,666 firms 
from 19 OECD countries for the period from 1996 to 2005. The results show that 
these characteristics affect the sticky cost in all businesses. For example, the strong 
bargaining power of trade unions leads to severe sticky cost, while a high level of 
unemployment benefits leads to low sticky cost. This study  shows that the sticky 
cost is not mechanically derived from the changes of activities in production 
volume, but it comes from and is influenced by many factors such as aggregates, the 
state of the economy of the country etc.. 
 
Chen et al (2008) in a study they carried out on a sample of 1500 firms found a 
positive correlation between the incentives of managers and the degree of cost 
stickiness. Essentially they confirmed the theory of ABJ (2003), however putting 
corporate governance as a means of retaining managers from overspending. Weiss 
(2010) in his research on a sample of 2,520 firms over a period of 20 years, showed 
that companies with high sticky cost have less accurate earnings forecasts by 
analysts, than those with low sticky cost. This is because profits on companies with 
high sticky cost, are greatly reduced when economic activity is declining, while the 
cost remains constant. This leads to high volatility earnings complicating the work 
of analysts (Dichev& Tang, 2008). 
 
Banker et al (2012) agree with ABJ (2003) that the costs do not fluctuate with 
changes in sales, so there is asymmetry and note that when the sales of the previous 
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period have increased we have sticky cost, and when the sales previous period have 
reduced we have anti-sticky cost. The need for information is very important for 
both investors and financial institutions. This is because, incorrect assessments of 
investors (Beyer et. al, 2010) and the limited financing of small firms (Felsesteinet. 
et, al., 1998), because of information asymmetry, lead to market failure. Bartik 
(1991) notes that the failure of the market is due to the fact that viable business plans 
are not supported by the private markets. Also the public sector should intervene to 
stimulate the market by offering low interest loans and to eliminate discrimination 
from asymmetries in information. 
 
The analyst forecasts for earnings differ from the actual values (Womack (1996); 
Kothari (2001); Brown (2003). A major factor affecting the accuracy of the 
estimates, is the size of the brokerage companies where analysts are working, which 
is negatively correlated with the forecast errors (Thalassinos and Pociovalisteanu 
2007, Mouna et al, 2010). The reason for this, is that large financial institutions 
provide access to a large database on macro-economical aggregates (Jennings, 
1987), the right tools and attractive rewards for analysts (Mouna et al, 2010) 
.Bhushan (1989) correlated positively the size of the brokerage firms with the 
predictive accuracy of analysts. 
 
The accuracy of the prediction is negatively correlated with the number of firms that 
analysts are tracking, which is attributed to the difficulty of analysts to deal with 
several companies simultaneously (Clement, 1999). On the contrary, Jacob et al 
(1999) argue that the number of firms tracked by analysts, does not affect the quality 
of their services. The time horizon, ie the difference between the forecast date and 
the earnings announcement date, is also an important factor in the prediction 
accuracy of earnings by analysts.  Clement (1999) believes that prediction errors 
increase as the forecast horizon is prolonged. 
 
Last but not least, Mouna et al. (2010) estimate that experience does not play a 
significant role in the ability of forecasting either, because skilled analysts have 
developed good relations with managers and form their forecasts according to their 
preferences, or because the configuration estimates vary from year to year, so even 
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2.          Methodology 
 
Our methodology was based on the work of Baumgartenet. et.al. (2011). The ground 
work uses the model of ABJ (2003) which is calculated three times. In the first 
calculation the actual changes in the cost of sales are taken into account, in the 
second estimates of the changes with a long time horizon and in the third estimates 
of the changes with a short horizon. 
 
In our research we used only the first regression model, since we wanted to study 
exclusively whether the sticky cost exists or not. The model has the following form: 
 log � Costi′t
Costi′t−1
� =  𝛽𝛽0 + β1 ∗  � 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆i′tSalesi′t−1� ∗  DecreaseDummyi′t ∗ log � 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆i′tSalesi′t−1� +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖′𝑡𝑡  
 
                                 
Where: Costi′t =  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆i′t −  Earningsi′t. 
 DecreaseDummyi′t = 1 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆i′t  <  Salesi′t−1 
 DecreaseDummyi′t = 0 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆i′t  >  Salesi′t−1 
 
 
To calculate the above formula, we drew data of sales and profits from the financial 
statements of companies. The costs were calculated by deducting from sales profits. 
We also use a dummy variable (dummy variable), which takes the value: 
 
• 0 when the sales of the current period increased compared with the previous  
 
• 1 when the sales of the current period decrease from previous  
 
The duration of the sample concerns 12 years, ie from 2001 to 2012 and the data are 
coming straight from the Hellas Stat SA (Greek Statistical & Financial Information 
Company) and judged as reliable because Hellas Stat SA has the largest 
electronically editable database for economic and business information for more 
than 100,000 companies and 150 branches covering the entire spectrum of economic 
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activity in Greece. In our sample, we chose (438) companies engaged in the retail 
sale of food, beverages and tobacco. 
 
In our sample, we exclude business financial statements concerning economic years 
before 2001 or after 2012, this was because this time period  was the greatest 
possible at Hellas Stat SA database, in order to have a large sample and emerge 
more reliable results .. Also,  only SA companies were selected, excluding other 
types of companies such as (ΕΠΕ. OE.ΕΕ). Finally, we excluded companies that  
include outliers on their balance sheets  to reduce the error rate in the regression 
carried out. The table below presents descriptive statistics of our sample on the 
actual changes in sales and cost. 
 
Table 1: Statistical description of sample 
 
  Mean 
𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺
𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑺𝑺
 Q1 Median Q3 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆i′tSalesi′t−1 1.086 0.33 0.93 1.01 1.13 
Actuals       
 
Costi′tCosti′t−1 ` 1.096 0.26 0.94 1.096 1.138 
 
3.          Results 
 
The following table shows the results for the regression of actual changes in costs 
for the upcoming changes in sales. The model explains 62.2% of the total variance. 
From the F-test (sig <0.001), we conclude that the model contributes significantly to 
our appreciation of the variables. 
 




 t-value Sig R Adj*R2 N 
-0,002 β0 -1,067 0.286    
1,011 β1 72,705 0.000 0.789 62,3% 438 
-0,106 β2 -5,006 0.000    
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Our results are in agreement with those of Baumgartenet. al. (2011). The coefficient 
β2 is negative - 0.106 statistically different from zero at 1% (t - statistic -5,006). 
Specifically in sales growth of 1% the cost increases 1011 (β1) and a decrease of 1% 
sales cost is the value of 0.905 (β1 + β2). The estimated value β1 shows that total 
spending increased 1,011% for the sector food, beverages and tobacco in Greece per 
1% increase in total sales. The combination of the values (β1 + β2) shows that the 
total cost decreased 0.905% per 1% decrease in sales. 
 
4.          Conclusion 
 
Understanding the behavior of costs is fundamental to the management of each 
company. Managers are always interested in the cost of products and activities. In 
recent years,  a new 'kind' of cost has emerged  called ¨sticky cost¨, which increases 
more with increasing  sales, than it will decrease when sales go down in the same 
proportion. This contrasts with the traditional costs (fixed and variable). 
 
In the methodology, we are based on the theory of asymmetric behavior of costs 
mainly developed by Anderson Banker and Janakiraman (2003) and in particular on 
the application of Baumgartenet. al. (2011). Making regression on a sample of  438 
firms regarding Food, Beverages and Tobacco sectors over 12 years (2001-2012) 
and we found  that an increase in sales of 1% results in  1,011 increase of costs and 
that a decrease of 1% in sales results in  0.905 decrease in our costs . So, the costs 
are very inelastic (β2 -0.106). 
 
The results of the study have important implications for the professionals who 
evaluate changes in the costs in association with changes in revenue. Understanding 
sticky cost would help Greek companies to identify and manage more efficiently the 
capacity and resources. 
 
Let us hope that future studies will try to further explain where sticky cost originates 
from. Accurate predictions are beneficial for businesses, in order for them to avoid 
unnecessary expenses and to make appropriate decisions in the right moments. To 
conclude, it is important for economic analysts to have good communication with 
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